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Abstract
As runway incursions continue to occur, a
radical change is required in the technique used
for runway conflict mitigation. This paper
presents the concept of an airborne runway
conflict alerting and resolution system that
generates directive alerts to the crew in order to
instruct them on the action that should be taken
to resolve the conflict. The system proposed
utilises aircraft performance calculations to
evaluate the viability of potential escape
manoeuvres that could avert a collision as the
basis of directing the crew into taking the safest
action. A preliminary pilot assessment of the
directive alerting philosophy has been carried
out to qualitatively assess crew acceptance of
this novel alerting philosophy in runway conflict
mitigation.
1 Introduction
During runway operations, aircraft are
constantly operating in close proximity of other
aircraft and other vehicles. Separation from such
hazards, therefore, is of prime importance in
assuring the safe continuation of the manoeuvre.
In controlled airfields, the ATCO is responsible
for the control of traffic in and around the
airfield and it is the ATCO who provides
clearances for aircraft to enter a runway, take-
off or land. It is therefore the ATCO who
ensures that any movements are well clear of
the particular aircraft in take-off or landing. In
essence, the ATCO reserves the runway (or a
portion of it) for the exclusive use of this
aircraft and procedures are rigorously followed
in order to ensure safe separation from other
aircraft and vehicles. Nevertheless, it is good
airmanship for pilots to independently ensure
that they are cleared to enter a runway, land on
it or take-off, that the approaches of a runway
are indeed clear before entering it and, before
taking off or landing, that the runway itself is
clear. Such actions are, of course, more effective
in situations of good visibility and in reduced
visibility and bad weather, pilots and ATCOs
are more careful to ensure that separation is
indeed maintained. In fact, reduced visibility
operations are subject to more stringent
separation rules, where separation between
aircraft is intentionally increased and certain
manoeuvres are not allowed. Therefore, whereas
the procedure dictates that the ATCO is
responsible for traffic separation, the pilot also
plays an active role in ensuring that the required
separation is indeed preserved. The pilot also
plays a critical role in restoring this separation
when it is lost and this role is essential for the
mitigation of the risk of collision.
However, notwithstanding rigorous procedure,
training and good practice, the current
procedural method of maintaining separation is
prone to failure. This repeatedly results in
aircraft and vehicles coming in conflict with one
another on the runway. Indeed, in the US alone,
during the period 2004 to 2007, 1353 runway
incursions have been reported1 [1].
1 Based on the FAA definition of a runway incursion prior to
2008. Definition: any occurrence in the airport runway
environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person or object on
the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of
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Current procedure, therefore, can be considered
inadequate to ensure runway safety and thus
needs to be complemented by a means that
monitors traffic in the vicinity and warns the
pilot accordingly. In a way, a sort of ‘electronic-
eyes’ are required in order to substitute the
human eyes of the pilot (or ATCO) when he or
she fails to see or detect the conflict.
1.1 Runway Collision Avoidance Systems
A number of solutions have been proposed in an
attempt to mitigate the risk of runway collisions.
These can conceptually be divided into two
philosophies, namely ground-based systems that
are installed in an airport and airborne solutions
that are installed on board aircraft (and therefore
are independent of equipment installed in
airports).
Several airports have already been equipped
with ground based systems capable of advising
ATC in the case of a runway incursion and these
have shown to be effective in a number of
conflict cases. However, the very nature of
ground based systems introduces delays
between the time the conflict is detected at the
ATC station and the time the crew of the aircraft
concerned take evasive action to mitigate the
conflict. This is inadequate in certain
circumstances, since reaction time may be
critical for the safe avoidance of the collision. A
further limitation is that ground-based systems
depend on the ATCO transmitting the correct
instruction in a timely, efficient and
unambiguous manner over the radio. In critical
situations, this may be a demanding task and
indeed may even not be managed successfully.
For these reasons, therefore, ground based
systems can only provide a partial solution to
the problem of runway traffic conflicts.
This suggests that an airborne system is required
to effectively mitigate the hazards associated
with runway incursion, with the scope of
required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take
off, landing or intending to land.
reducing the time between system alert and pilot
reaction. Ideally, crews should be alerted of a
potential runway incursion before it develops.
Various approaches can be adopted, such as
alerting the crew that a particular runway is
being approached. However, due to human
error, this technique may not completely resolve
the problem and a method that alerts the pilot of
an error or conflict once committed will still be
required as a last-resort safety net. This,
however, requires the system to be aware of the
clearances given to the crew, possibly via
Controller Pilot Datalink Communications
(CPDLC). However, CPDLC is known to
potentially have a latency of up to several tens
of seconds and this renders the application
useless as a means of reliably alerting the
occurrence of a runway incursion.
An alternative strategy to clearance monitoring
is to provide traffic surveillance to determine
whether a potential physical conflict with
another aircraft or vehicle on the runway exists.
Whilst such a system does not protect against
the violation of clearances, it can provide
independent, robust and complete protection
against runway conflicts and thus mitigate the
risk of collision.
Providing on-board alerting in the event of a
conflict in take-off or landing is an
improvement over the current operational
standard. However, in providing advisory alerts
via the visual and/or auditory channels that only
advise the crew of the existence of a conflict
situation, the crew are essentially tasked with
the problem of identifying what action should
be taken.  Besides introducing the problem of
correctly interpreting the conflict scenario –
which is critical in the decisions that need to be
taken to resolve the conflict, such alerting may
add significant workload to crew in critical
moments of the take-off or landing. Indeed,
following the annunciation of an alert, the crew
must perform four sequential mental and
physical processes to resolve the conflict.  First,
they must identify the conflict and its position in
relation to that of their own aircraft (referred to
as the ownship aircraft). Then they must
identify a manoeuvre that will successfully
resolve the conflict. Next they must decide to
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execute this manoeuvre and finally actually
execute it.
These four steps can take several seconds to
complete, even under normal working
conditions. The high workload environment
during take-off or landing and the inexperience
of crew in handling such situations further
compounds the problem, thereby increasing the
chances of the crew hesitating in taking the
correct action and may even lead to an incorrect
decision in the circumstances. Indeed, human
decision-making capabilities and reaction times
are heavily compromised under high workloads
and when threatening situations are announced
without prior warnings. As a result, the chances
of the crew erring in any of the four named
steps, thereby breaking the path to successful
conflict mitigation, is significant.
Consequently, this work is aimed at tackling
these exact problems through the design of an
onboard system that, apart from being capable
of monitoring the traffic movements in the
vicinity of the ownship or its intended path and
determining whether a conflict or potential
conflict exists, it is capable of determining an
escape manoeuvre that will successfully resolve
the conflict, thereby relieving the crew of three
of the above four steps and consequently
significantly simplifying the human processes
involved in conflict mitigation. Logically, this
requires the design and implementation of an
appropriate cockpit alerting scheme to reliably
support the transfer of information to the crew
in a timely manner through the auditory and
visual channels.
2 The Runway Collision Avoidance Function
(RCAF)
The system being proposed, referred to as the
RCAF, has an architecture based on the traffic
management model described in [2]. It
incorporates the three basic functional
requirements of traffic surveillance, conflict
detection and conflict resolution. The
surveillance and conflict detection module
performs the necessary operations to monitor
the aircraft surroundings for intruding traffic
and generates a conflict flag once a physical
conflict is detected. The role of the conflict
mitigation module is to then select the most
appropriate manoeuvre to avoid the collision.
Figure 1 shows the high level functional blocks
of the RCAF and its interaction with the
environment.
When an aircraft is cleared to make use of a
runway for take-off or landing, the designated
runway is essentially reserved for sole use by
that aircraft. Any other aircraft or vehicle
entering this reserved area results in a runway
conflict. For this reason, it is natural to design a
conflict detection algorithm based on this
concept. This is similar to the concept of a
`protected zone' or no transgression zone (NTZ)
surrounding an aircraft whilst airborne, which
defines a region into which no other entity must
enter to ensure safety of the flight [3,4].
Figure 1 – The RCAF Architecture
The protected zone of an aircraft during runway
manoeuvres can be defined as the entirety of the
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runway [5], extended in length and width by
some fixed amounts (Figure 2). Although a
procedural conflict is caused whenever traffic
enters the protected zone assigned to the
ownship, this does not always result in a
physical conflict or a risk of collision. For
example, the entry of a vehicle or aircraft on the
runway behind the ownship during take-off
constitutes a runway incursion from a
procedural perspective but poses no particular
risk of collision. In such circumstances, it is
considered inappropriate to alert the crew of the
runway incursion, as this would distract them
unnecessarily from the manoeuvre they are
conducting, thereby inadvertently increasing the
risk of accident. This and other such
considerations have resulted in the identification
of the need to develop a generic conflict
detection algorithm based on a set of rules that
are functions of the kinematic states of the
movements involved as well as the dynamics of
the scenario. Overall, it is the quality of these
rules that determines how nuisance alerts are
suppressed or avoided. Although the design of
the conflict detection algorithm is a critical
consideration in the whole design of the
solution, it is not the subject of this paper, as it
is already available in the literature [6, 7].
Figure 2 - Definition of the Protected Zone (in blue)
Once the RCAF detects a runway conflict, the
conflict resolution engine is required to
determine an escape manoeuvre that will
successfully resolve the conflict. Determining a
feasible escape manoeuvre during a runway
operation requires the consideration of the
performance capability of the aircraft.
2.1 Conflict Mitigation During Takeoff
To maintain compliance with standard operating
procedures, runway conflict avoidance
manoeuvres for an aircraft in take-off are
reduced to one of two: continue take-off or
rejected take-off. Naturally, the selection of one
manoeuvre over the other depends on which
solution is the most advantageous, resulting in
the least possible danger to human life and
aircraft damage. Therefore, mitigating a runway
conflict during take-off requires an assessment
of the aircraft's take-off performance. In this
manner, it would be possible to predict the
distance required for the aircraft in take-off to
become airborne and reach the screen height.
Similarly, in the case of an aborted take-off at
any speed below V1, it would be possible to
predict the position on the runway where the
aircraft would come to a halt. As a result, in the
situation where a runway conflict does occur, an
assessment could be done on what action
(continued or aborted take-off) is best suited to
reduce the probability of collision.
EASA Part 25 regulations [8] define the take-off
distance required (TODR) as being the distance
required for an aircraft to reach the screen
height from brake-release. Regulations also
define the distance required from brake-release
to lift-off and this is referred to as the take-off
run required (TORR). The distance required for
an aircraft to a halt after an abort at the most
critical moment (V1) is called the accelerate-
stop distance required (ASDR) or emergency
distance required (EDR). TODR, TORR and
ASDR are depicted graphically in Figure 3.
These lengths are dependent on aircraft type, as
well as environmental and operational
conditions such as ambient temperature,
pressure and humidity, wind conditions, runway
slope, aircraft weight and thrust settings, and
flap configuration. Consequently, operators
calculate the expected (scheduled) distances
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required for each take-off prior to dispatch,
taking into consideration many of the factors to
ensure that the runway distances available
(defined as TODA, TORA and ASDA)
accommodate those required. Regulations also
specify that an aircraft must be capable of
continuing safe flight even if one engine fails
during any phase of the journey, including take-
off. Therefore scheduled distances (TODR,
TORR and ASDR) are based on the occurrence
of one engine failure at the most critical point
during take-off.
Figure 3 - Take-off Performance Schedule
The regulations also define gross and net
performance.  Gross performance refers to the
average expected performance of an aircraft in
the scheduled (planned) manoeuvre.  Hence,
gross performance essentially defines distances
that, statistically, an aircraft is expected to have
a 50% chance of exceeding. For this reason a
leeway is introduced in TODR and TORR for
the AEO case, to reduce the probability of
exceeding these distances to a level of 10-7.
Statistically, this requires an addition of 5
standard deviations (5σ) to the average (gross)
distances, resulting in what is referred to as net
performance distances.  Since σ is about 3% [9],
the addition of a 15% leeway to TODR and
TORR is adequate to ensure that all but 1 in 10-7
take-off runs will not exceed these allowances.
In the case of rejected take-off (RTO) the
distance of interest is that required to bring the
aircraft to a halt. The distance travelled during
the transition phase of a RTO (the aircraft
motion as the crew commence the abort by
reducing thrust and applying speedbrakes and
braking devices) cannot be quantified
analytically and can only by estimated by
allowing for the regulated quantity of time
(typically 2s [16]) for the crew to reduce thrust
and deploy maximum braking. However,
whereas in the acceleration phase, the reliable
prediction of distance is possible through the
accurate modelling the acceleration profile, this
is not the case during deceleration, where the
frictional coefficient is highly dependent on the
braking capacity, tyre wear and actual runway
surface condition.
Table 1 - Classification of Failure Condition. Adapted
from CS-25 [8]
The distance required from break release to a
full stop (ASDR) is scheduled as a gross
distance by regulation, and this again results in
only a 50% chance of successfully reaching a
halt in the allowed distance (assuming the run is
aborted at V1). This implies that, when using
scheduled performance as the basis of collision
avoidance, an additional leeway needs to be
added to allow for a higher probability of
stopping in the allocated distance.
The distance required for the aircraft to be
brought to a halt after aborting a run at any
speed VX < V1 is likewise known a priori,
through scheduled performance calculations.
The total distance from break release to a halt
after aborting a take-off at VX is herein termed
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ASDRX. The distance-velocity graph for various
abort initiation velocities is as shown in Figure
4 allowing for a 2 second reaction time at VX.
Figure 4 - ASDR factored for various abort initiation
velocities
In general, the deceleration characteristic of an
aircraft during braking is dependent on the
braking force and idle thrust characteristics,
with the former being of larger influence. For
large aircraft, braking force and thrust are
generally related to speed by quadratic
polynomials [10-13]. Thrust polynomial
coefficients depend on several atmospheric
parameters including pressure and temperature.
The braking force polynomial coefficients are
highly dependent on the frictional coefficient
between the aircraft tyres and the runway
surface. Scheduled braking distances cater for
atmospheric variations by compensating for
airport altitude and temperature and cater for
surface condition by tabulating gross distance
variations with runway friction index (RFI). In a
joint study [10] by NASA, Transport Canada
and the FAA on business jets, medium and large
aircraft, the frictional coefficient μ was
experimentally found to be approximately
constant with airspeed with a slight drop in μ at
higher speeds and approximately linearly related
to the RFI. Rather than using a best linear fit
through the experimental data points of RFI
versus μ, a minimum performance fit is taken
such that only 5% of the data points fall below
the fit. In this manner, the linear fit provides a
95% confidence when tabulating the aircraft
braking coefficient with RFI, leading to the
same confidence limit in the scheduled braking
distance required.
In the event of a runway conflict occurring
during take-off, the scheduled TODR and
ASDRX could be used to assess whether a
continued or aborted take-off (stop or go) would
be the more beneficial in the circumstances.
Since regulations defines TODR as the take-off
distance required to reach the 35ft screen height,
an additional distance to the net TODR is
required to ensure sufficient vertical clearance
between the ownship and the intruder. As a first
approximation, this additional distance Δ can be
calculated assuming the regulatory minimum
first-segment climb gradient tabulated in the
aircraft flight manual (AFM).
Consider a runway conflict as depicted in Figure
5, where the intruder enters the protected zone
far down the runway such that there is sufficient
runway distance left for the ownship to continue
the take-off and clear the intruder as well as a
sufficient distance to abort the run and bring the
aircraft to a halt before reaching the intruder. In
this case, although a continued take-off is
possible and leads to the least economic impact,
a runway conflict has indeed occurred and crew
are procedurally required to abort the run. In a
similar situation where the intruder is positioned
outside the ownship’s ASDRX but within the
ownship’s TODR, then the only viable
manoeuvre for conflict mitigation is that of
performing a RTO.
In the situation depicted in Figure 6, the
intruder’s position is such that the ownship can
successfully complete the take-off in the
distance remaining but however cannot
successfully come to a halt in the case of a
RTO. In this case, continuing the take-off and
flying over the intruder safely is clearly the
preferred solution.
The third combination considered is when the
intruder enters the runway such that there is
insufficient distance remaining for the ownship
to safely fly over the intruder and also
insufficient distance for the ownship to perform
a RTO and come safely to a halt prior to
reaching the intruder (Figure 7). In such a case
attempting to continue the take-off normally or
rotate earlier is not an accepted option, as this
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could readily result in a high speed collision
with the ownship either still on the ground or
having just become airborne before it will have
reached sufficient height to clear the intruder.
For this reason, the consequences of performing
a RTO outweigh those of the continued take-off
case. By initiating braking, the aircraft’s energy
is being dissipated, improving the chances for
the crew to take a lateral evasive manoeuvre to
avoid the collision or at worst be involved in a
low speed collision.
2.1.1 Operation at the stop/go boundaries
In the case where the decision to go or stop is
marginal, any uncertainty in aircraft
performance or aircraft position can
significantly impact the outcome of the
decision. Both the ownship’s and intruder’s
reported position suffer from measurement
error. The ownship’s position, derived from
GPS data, has a scatter following a bivariate
Gaussian distribution in the order of 3m-9m
dRMS horizontally2. The intruder’s reported
position is derived from ADS-B which in turn is
also supplied with GPS data for reporting. ADS-
B packaging of data suffers from quantisation
errors, which however are not significant,
compared to the accuracy of GPS.
Consequently, the overall intruder reported
position is also bivariate Gaussian distributed
with typical accuracy in the order of 3m-9m
dRMS. Whilst the distribution of GPS derived
errors follows an elliptical distribution in the
horizontal direction, it can be very well
approximated as circular owing to good
unobstructed satellite coverage and hence low
HDOP values. Working with this
approximation, dRMS defines the 1.41σ (63%)
containment circle of reported positions. To
ease analysis, the error in reported position of
the ownship could be reflected onto the intruder
(or vice-versa), with the ownship then being
represented as error free. Consequently, the
2 The variation in accuracy is mainly dependent on the
satellite coverage and geometry, quantified by horizontal
dilution of precision (HDOP). At the 99.9th percentile,
HDOP is less than 1.77 worldwide for unobstructed view.
additive reported error for both mobiles is in the
order of 4m-13m dRMS. When both mobiles
are subscribed to a differential GPS service,
accuracy is improved, typically between 0.4m-
1m dRMS for the ownship and 1m-1.4m dRMS
for the intruder due to ADS-B quantisation
error3. The additive reported error for both
mobiles is then between 1m-1.7m dRMS.
The uncertainty in the range to the intruder and
its associated probability density function can
be used in conjunction with the theoretical
probability density function associated with
gross performance to estimate the probability of
the stop and go decisions being successful in
avoiding the conflict. This will require intensive
numerical computation, which is not appropriate
for the application. Consequently, simplified
rules can be implemented to provide an estimate
of the probability of a go or stop action would
be successful. The final decision taken would
then be based on these probabilities and,
potentially, on the implications of the outcome
being unsuccessful. For illustrative purposes,
consider a scenario where the ownship has an
equal probability of successfully overflying an
intruder (if the take-off is continued) and of
coming to a stop before it (if the take-off is
aborted).  The implications of failure of the two
manoeuvres would not be the same, as the
former would most certainly result in a high
speed collision, whilst the latter would have a
lower collision speed and therefore probably
result in less injury or death.
Such a consideration, however, is a point of
major debate and potential controversy.  Firstly,
this approach would complicate certification.
Secondly, the method needs to be acceptable to
the pilot community. Furthermore, liability
issues and legal interpretation may influence
acceptance by operators. Consequently, this
issue needs to be addressed further before
implementation.
3 Assuming a 2.4m uniform quantiser, being the worst
case quantiser for MODE-S, UAT and VDL-4 datalinks.
A. Sammut, D. Zammit-Mangion, B. Zammit
8
Figure 6 - Runway Conflict during Take-off – Can go, Cannot stop
Figure 7 - Runway Conflict during Take-off - Cannot go, Cannot Stop
Figure 5 - Runway Conflict during Take-off - Can go, Can Stop
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2.2 Conflict Mitigation During Landing
Runway conflicts occurring with the ownship in
final approach are relatively easily mitigated by
initiating a missed approach. However, the
generation of unnecessary missed approaches
needs to be mitigated. Such false alerts would
certainly reduce confidence in the system and
may have safety implications in situations
where the ownship is low on fuel or in the case
of bad weather. The risk is especially of note in
busy airports, where it is normal for traffic to be
present on the runway (albeit perhaps vacating)
whilst the ownship is approaching the airfield to
land. Consequently, to avoid the generation of
nuisance warnings, the location of any
conflicting traffic on the runway with respect to
the ownship’s expected landing distance
requirements (LDR) is considered.
Regulations define the landing distance as the
sum of the airborne distance from the screen
height over the threshold to touchdown and the
ground distance from touchdown to when the
aircraft is brought to standstill. The ground run
is calculated based on a dry runway using
maximum braking, with a one second delay for
deployment of automatic brakes. Credit for the
use of thrust reverse is not considered. The
landing distance of a particular aircraft is
demonstrated during certification flight tests and
the average is termed the unfactored or actual
landing distance (ALD).
In practice, however, there are various
operational factors that affect the repeatability
of the landing distance. The most significant is
piloting technique, where the flare and touch-
down manoeuvre have a significant impact on
the overall ALD. Naturally, automatic landings
such as those associated with Category IIIB
operations4, should result in higher repeatability
than manual landings. In fact, auto-land
dispersion is found to exhibit a normal
distribution [14,15]. Manual landings, in
4 Precision instrument approach and landing which could
be used in low visibility with runway visual ranges down
to 75m. The autopilot is used until taxi-speed
comparison, can be expected to exhibit a larger
variation that may not be normally distributed.
As in the rejected take-off case, the deceleration
distance during landing is highly dependent on
the frictional coefficient and cannot be modelled
accurately, particularly on wet or contaminated
runways without precise knowledge of the
braking coefficient.
Part 25 regulations state that the certified ALD
must be factored by 1.67 for dry runways to
compensate for these variations and an extra
15% (resulting in an overall factor of 1.92) for
wet runways. The factored ALD is called the
landing distance required (LDR). This means
that for a dry runway an aircraft should land
within 60% of its scheduled LDR, allowing
40% margin. However, when operating on a wet
runway, the 1.92 factor is based on the dry
runway certified landing distance. Whilst this
provides no insight to the available margin of
error [8,16], these allowances were assumed to
constitute 5 standard deviations of a normally
distributed density function characterising the
distribution of landing distance.
When the ownship is in the approach for
landing and has still not crossed the runway
threshold, the threat posed by third party aircraft
manoeuvring on the runway surface depends on
its position on the extended runway centreline.
For instance, an aircraft taxing at the far end of
the runway outside the ownship’s LDR,
possibly with the intention of vacating shortly,
could be of little threat to the safety of the
ownship. In such circumstances, delaying the
generation of an alert until the situation
develops further would not mpact safety whilst
being beneficial in avoiding the execution of a
missed approach that could be avoided. In such
circumstances, suppression of the alert is
maintained until the ownship reaches the 50ft
screen height. If traffic is still present on the
runway, albeit being beyond the ownship’s LDR
and the ownship reaches the screen height, a
missed approach is considered to be the safest
and preferred option in accordance with current
procedures. In the case of Land and Hold Short
(LAHSO) operations, the effective runway
length and associated protection zone are based
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on the length of runway associated with the
landing manoeuvre.
In comparison, a conflict event such as that
involving an aircraft lined up for take-off on the
runway on which the ownship intends to land
poses a much higher safety risk and thus
requires earlier action with the ownship
initiating a missed approach. Nevertheless, the
generation of such an alert still needs to be
delayed until it is evident that the conflict will
not be resolved without ownship intervention, in
order to avoid unnecessary missed approaches.
Thus, the timing of the generation of the alert on
the ownship is based on the ownship’s
performance and the need to maintain a
minimum safe separation with the intruder
under conflict conditions.
From this discussion it is evident that the logic
for alerting during landing is partitioned into
two phases; that prior to the ownship reaching
the threshold and that once the ownship
surpasses the threshold. A runway conflict
occurring with the ownship on or beyond the
threshold requires immediate alerting to direct
the crew into conducting a missed approach.
However, prior to reaching the threshold, the
intruder’s position on the runway determines
whether the alert is issued or not. If the intruder
is within the ownship’s LDR, the alert is issued
as late as possible whilst assuring that the
missed approach is performed safely. If the
intruder is beyond the LDR, then the alert is
suppressed until the ownship reaches the
threshold, when the conditions of conflict are
assessed again prior to the generation of any
alert.
3 Alerting Scheme
Due consideration was given to the Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) of the system. The
RCAF makes use of the aural channel for
providing the directive alerts as this is the
fastest way of attracting the crew’s attention
without added head-down time. However, aural
alerts cannot provide information relating to
which aircraft is in conflict and where it is
situated on the airfield. The merits of having
such additional information in the cockpit were
left to simulator assessment and evaluation and
consequently. In order to support this, the
RCAF was given the capability of driving an
airport moving map display, which, in the case
of an alert would highlight the conflicting
traffic.
3.1 Alerting During Take-off
During normal operation, the RCAF is silent
and generates no alerts, having no effect on
normal take-off procedures.
In the event of a runway conflict, where the
algorithm determines the safest evasive
manoeuvre as being a RTO, a ‘WHOOP
WHOOP - STOP-TRAFFIC’ alert is generated5.
The ‘Whoop Whoop’ lasts 1 second and is
similar in principle to current GPWS ‘Pull-Up’
alerts. It is intended as an attention grabber prior
to the verbal instruction. The verbal instruction
first advises the crew on the manoeuvre that
needs to be executed immediately, followed by
the rationale behind the instruction. This alert
state is sustained and the completed alert
repeated periodically every 4.5 seconds until the
crew initiate the abort by retarding the thrust
levers or initiating braking. On the generation of
such an alert, operating procedures will require
the crew to immediately follow the directive
alert and initiate the RTO sequence. During
deceleration, distance call-outs to the intruder
are generated to give the crew an indication of
the separation left in metres6 between the
ownship and the intruder as well as indicating
closure rate as the callouts are generated
sequentially (eg. ‘900...800...700’). Once the
conflict is resolved, a ‘CONFLICT CLEAR’
alert is generated.
5 The exact wording of the alert itself is not critical to
scope of the study and could be modified to suite
manufacturer/operator convention.
6 Distance call-outs may alternatively be  made in feet,
depending on airline operating procedures.
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In the event of a runway conflict where the
safest option being a continued the take-off, the
RCAF remains silent and the crew are expected
to continue the takeoff by following Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs).
The logic driving the directive alerts during
take-off is depicted in Figure 8.
Figure 8 - Logic Diagram for alerting during Take-off
3.2 Alerting During Landing
As in the take-off case, no alerts are generated
during normal operation and the RCAF has no
effect on SOPs for normal conditions.
In the event of a runway conflict, the crew will
be instructed to perform a missed approach with
the alert ‘WHOOP WHOOP - GO-AROUND,
TRAFFIC’. As in the case for take-off, the alert
starts with an attention grabber and is repeated
every 4.5 seconds until the crew initiate the
missed approach procedure, detected by the
appropriate re-setting of the thrust levers. Once
again, procedures would require the crew to
immediately react to the alert and conduct the
directed manoeuvre. As in the take-off case, a
‘CONFLICT-CLEAR’ alert is generated once
the conflict is resolved.
If a runway conflict occurs after the ownship
has touched down and is decelerating, then the
aircraft is committed to continue to landing
manoeuvre. In this case, the scenario is similar
to rejecting the take-off in the event of a conflict
during take-off. The algorithm likewise issues a
single ‘WHOOP WHOOP - STOP-TRAFFIC’
alert followed by distance call-outs.
In the case of a suppressed alert (or delayed
with the intention of reducing nuisance alerts),
the RCAF remains silent, indicating that the
crew is expected to continue their approach by
following SOPs.
The logic driving the directive alerts during
landing is depicted in Figure 9.
4 Preliminary Pilot Assessment
A preliminary assessment of the RCAF’s novel
alerting methodology was conducted on
Cranfield University’s Large Aircraft Flight
Simulator. This simulator provides an
immersive environment typical of a large
transport category aircraft. The cockpit
environment is based on that of a Boeing 747,
with a mix of Airbus and Boeing cockpit
features being introduced, rendering the
environment generic (Figure 10). The simulator
has collimated optics to allow for realistic cross-
cockpit viewing.  This is an important feature in
the current study.
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4.1 Scope and Assessment Procedure
The scope of the preliminary assessment was to
assess the general validity and effectiveness of
the alerting scheme prior to full pilot
evaluation. This provided the opportunity to
test the general qualitative attributes of the
alerting at an early stage, thus allowing the
authors to introduce any improvements that
may be necessary prior to finalisation of the
alerting scheme.  In this way, the value of the
pilot evaluation exercise could be maximised.
A group of 2 crew sets (4 pilots) was selected
to participate in the preliminary pilot
assessment.  The two crews were taken from
pool of respondents aged between 24 years and
50 years. Both Captains and senior First
Officers took part and all were type rated and
current on the Airbus A320. The participants
were asked to participate in the experiments
designed for the eventual pilot assessment [17].
The specific scenarios used for the eventual
pilot evaluation are presented in Table 2.
These were designed to cover different phases
of the take-off and landing manoeuvres, thus
providing for a comprehensive assessment of
the alerting philosophy. All except for
scenarios 1 and 3 were used in the preliminary
pilot assessment described herein. Of these,
only Scenario 8 was not set in low visibility
conditions. Low visibility was intended to
preclude the crew from seeing the intruder by
the time an alert is generated.  Scenario 8 was
designed to test the impact of crews seeing the
intruder, thereby effectively providing two
independent channels of information relating to
the conflict (the visual channel and the alerting
channel). Each of the selected 12 scenarios was
operated in crews of two ensuring ecological
Figure 9 - Logic Diagram for Alerting during Landing
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validity, with the more senior member acting as
the pilot in command (PIC).  After performing
half the scenarios, the role of the pilot flying
(PF) and pilot not flying (PNF) was swapped
with the intention of reducing the element of
learning, with regards to the generation of
alerts.
Figure 10 - The Cranfield Simulator
The scenarios were designed to exercise the
algorithm in typical runway conflict situations.
Seven scenarios were targeted to test the
algorithm with the ownship in take-off.  During
these scenarios, the runway conflict was
generated at various ownship speeds (low,
medium, high and at V1) and with various
visibility conditions, with the scope of
monitoring the crew reaction and compliance to
the alerts.
The assessment exercise involved asking
questions to the participants after each scenario
in order to capture their impressions before
moving on to the next scenario.  This allowed
the gathering of qualitative information that
was intended to address the following
attributes:
1. The acceptance of the directive alerting
concept for runway incursion alerting
2. The clarity of the alerts
3. The value of the whooping tone
preceding the verbal instruction.
4.2 Results and Discussion
4.2.1 Acceptance of the Alerting Concept
The crews responded positively to the alerting
concept, claiming that they are ‘happy with it’
and that they did not hesitate to follow the
instruction on all occasions (all scenarios). This
indicated that the philosophy should be
acceptable on the flight deck.  However, it must
be kept in mind that, although all crews had
flown the Boeing 737 (classic series), they
were, at the time, flying the Airbus A320. The
two major airframers have divergent cockpit
philosophies and as a result, the response
cannot be considered to reflect pilots flying
Boeing aircraft.
The generation of no alert in the case of
continuing a manoeuvre was also received
positively, despite the authors’ concern that it
could be interpreted as a failure of the system.
The crews’ view was confirmed with their
response in Scenario 8. In this setup, the
intruder was programmed so that it crossed the
hold short bar and proceeded to enter the
runway such that if the take-off were to be
aborted, a collision would occur, whilst if the
take-off were to be continued, the intruder
would be avoided.  The target aircraft could be
easily seen and the pilots did not hesitate to
continue the take-off with the RCAF generating
no alert. Furthermore, they reported that this
did not lead them to suspect that the system had
failed and thus did not compromise their
confidence in the system, as they are used to
this philosophy of cockpit alerting.
The crews also had no hesitation to follow the
directive alert in all manoeuvres and considered
it to be ‘very good’.
Furthermore, the distance call-outs were also
considered very useful, particularly in low
visibility conditions. They were also considered
a very good aid to assess the deceleration rate
being achieved.
A. Sammut, D. Zammit-Mangion, B. Zammit
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Table 2 - The Test Scenarios
# Ownship
state Target state Alert generated
Expected
pilot reaction
Visibility
(m)
1 Backtrack Taxiing in front of ownship at a
slow closure rate
When separation is less than
threshold and decreasing
Stop 100
2 Take-off Taxiing in front of ownship at a
slow closure rate
On setting thrust to take-off
setting
Abort 100
3 Lineup Approaching from behind As soon as target enters
protected zone
Vacate
runway
2000
4 Take-off Lined up in front of ownship On thrust setting Abort 200
5 Take-off Enters runway in front of ownship
when ownship speed exceeds 45kts
As soon as target enters
protected zone
Abort 600
6 Take-off Enters runway in front of ownship
when ownship speed exceeds 70kts
As soon as target enters
protected zone
Abort 400
7 Take-off Enters runway in front of ownship
when ownship speed exceeds
108kts
As soon as target enters
protected zone
Abort 400
8 Take-off Crosses hold-short bars to runway
ahead  of ownship at V1
No alert generated7 Continue 10,000
9 Landing Lined up When ownship is approx.
1nm from touchdown
Go-around 900
10 Landing Lands ahead of ownship but fails to
vacate runway
When ownship approaches
runway threshold
Go-around 10,000
11 Landing Enters runway As soon as target enters
protected zone
Go-around 900
12 Landing Aborts take-off and stops far down
the runway
When ownship approaches
runway threshold
Go-around 10,000
13 Landing Exits from the far end of the
runway
No alert generated8 Continue 10,000
14 Landed Enters runway in front of ownship As soon as target enters
protected zone
Stop 500
7 The RCAF generates no alert when it identifies that it is preferable to continue the manoeuvre.  This is in line with the
dark and silent cockpit concept.
4.2.2 Clarity of the Alert
The alerts were considered to be clear as the
crews had no difficulty with immediately
reacting as instructed.
4.2.3 Value of the Whooping Tone
The crews did not respond favourably to the
whooping tone.  Mainly this was because they
felt it delayed the generation of the verbal
instruction and that distracted from their timely
reaction to the threat and therefore
compromised the effectiveness of the system.
Indeed, a one second can make all the
difference in critical circumstances, with an
aircraft travelling at 100kts covering 50m in
this time.  It was also mentioned that on the
ground, the tone could instinctively lead to an
abort manoeuvre (stop) if crews did not wait
for the tone to terminate before reacting and
then this diluted the value of the verbal
instruction.  As a result, all pilots preferred the
verbal directive alert (instruction) without the
whooping tone preceding it.
5 Conclusion
A runway conflict alerting and resolution
system that generates directive alerts to the
crew in order to instruct them on the action that
should be taken to avoid a collision has been
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described. Such a system needs to use aircraft
performance to predict which particular
manoeuvre – that is, whether to continue or
abort – would successfully lead to the
avoidance of a collision. The appropriate alert
would then be generated. The value of directive
alerting is in the quick, objective decision-
making, relieving the crew of the task that may
be difficult to perform in challenging
conditions. When a continued manoeuvre is
suggested, the system does not generate an
alert, in compliance with the dark and silent
cockpit philosophy. When an abort is required,
the instruction ‘STOP – TRAFFIC’ or ‘GO-
AROUND, TRAFFIC’ is generated, depending
on the type of manoeuvre being carried out.
These verbal instructions are preceded by a
‘Whoop Whoop’ intended to act as an attention
grabber. Furthermore, whilst the aircraft is
braking, distance call-outs are generated.
This system has been tested in several
simulated take-off and landing scenarios
depicting conflicts at various stages of the
manoeuvres. A small number of pilots and an
immersive simulation environment were used
to obtain a preliminary assessment of the
alerting technique. The outcome of the
assessment suggests that the technique will be
acceptable in the cockpit and can have high
value in averting a collision on the runway.  An
attention grabber, however, may not be
favoured. These attributes will need to be
confirmed in more rigorous pilot evaluations
that follow this preliminary assessment.
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